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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ricardo Ozuna, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction for lewd conduct
following a jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in concluding
that Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 applied to bar presentation of proffered evidence that
he did not have sexual intercourse with the alleged victim because he had been told
that she had chlamydia, and when it prevented him from eliciting evidence that the
alleged victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault and that he has shown
no signs of chlamydia since the alleged assault. He further asserts that, even assuming
the proffered evidence fell within the confines of Rule 412, the district court violated his
constitutional rights to present a defense and to a fair trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments when it excluded the proffered evidence.

Additionally,

Mr. Ozuna asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life
sentence, with twenty years fixed, following his conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ricardo Ozuna, Jr., was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen, for alleged genital to genital contact, and a sentencing enhancement
under Idaho Code § 19-2520G.

(R., pp.36-37, 67-68.)

The charge stemmed from

allegations that Mr. Ozuna had unprotected sex with fifteen year old E.B. (Tr., p.282,

L.7 - p.303, L.9.)
Prior to the start of trial, Mr. Ozuna sought a ruling as to whether he could testify
that, on the night of the alleged assault, he was told by a friend of E.B. that she had
chlamydia, which caused him to have no interest in having sexual intercourse with her.
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Mr. Ozuna also sought permission to elicit testimony that E.B. had chlamydia at the time
of the alleged assault, and that he did not have chlamydia or show any signs of
chlamydia after the alleged assault. (Tr., p.229, L.9 - p.231, L.12.) The State opposed
the defense request, citing, inter a/ia, Idaho Rule of Evidence 412.

Ultimately, the

district court concluded that Rule 412 applied to bar the proffered evidence in both
areas. (Tr., p.255, L.5 - p.256, L.2.)
Following a jury trial, Mr. Ozuna was found guilty of lewd conduct (Tr., p.695,
Ls.9-25), and the sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.722, Ls.4-22.) The State requested
imposition of a unified life sentence, with twenty years fixed. (Sent.Tr., p.25, Ls.16-23.)
Defense counsel requested a unified sentence of thirty or thirty-five years, with fifteen
years fixed. (Sent.Tr., p.33, L.9 - p.34, L.23.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a
life sentence, with twenty years fixed.

(Sent.Tr., p.48, Ls.4-18.) He filed a Notice of

Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.227.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered evidence fell under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr. Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a
defense and to a fair trial, when it prevented him from testifying that he did not
have sexual intercourse with the alleged victim because he had been told that
she had chlamydia?

2.

Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered evidence fell under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr. Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a
defense and to a fair trial, when it prevented him from eliciting testimony that the
alleged victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault and that he had
shown no signs of chlamydia since the alleged assault?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a life sentence, with
twenty years fixed, following Mr. Ozuna's conviction for lewd conduct with a
sentencing enhancement?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Proffered Evidence Fell Under Idaho
Rule Of Evidence 412, And Violated Mr. Ozuna's Rights To Present A Defense And To
A Fair Trial, When It Prevented Him From Testifying That He Did Not Have Sexual
Intercourse With The Alleged Victim Because He Had Been Told That She Had
Chlamydia

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ozuna asserts that the district court erred in concluding that the proffered

evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violated his constitutional rights to
present a defense and to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 1
when it prevented him from testifying that he did not have sexual intercourse with

B.

because he had been told that she had chlamydia. The district court erred because the
proffered evidence did not fall within the scope of Rule 412.

Furthermore, even

assuming that it did, enforcing Rule 412 to bar its admission violated Mr. Ozuna's Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

B.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Proffered Evidence Fell Under
Idaho Rule Of Evidence 412, And Violated Mr. Ozuna's Constitutional Rights To
Present A Defense And To A Fair Trial, And Prevented Him From Testifying That
He Did Not Have Sexual Intercourse With The Alleged Victim Because He Had
Been Told That She Had Chlamydia
Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, in relevant part, provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, reputation or opinion evidence of the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sex crime is not
admissible.

1

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to present a defense
is "so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19
(1967) (footnote omitted).
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(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2)[2] and
is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of (A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the
accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the
source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim
consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which the sex
crime is alleged; or

(C) false allegations of sex crimes made at an earlier time; or
(D) sexual behavior with parties other than the accused
which occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex crime
charged.

(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means
sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which the
sex crime is alleged.

l.R.E.412.

1.

The Proffered Evidence Does Not Fall Within Rule 412

Mr. Ozuna maintains that the district court erred in excluding his proffered
testimony concerning his belief that E.B. had chlamydia as the reason that he did not

2

Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) concern the requirements of pre-trial notice and a
hearing. They are not relevant on appeal, as the district court concluded, at the
requisite hearing, that the motion was timely, and the prosecuting attorney made no
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have sexual intercourse with her because it is not the type of evidence that falls within
the strictures of Rule 412. 3
In his offer of proof concerning the proffered testimony, defense counsel set forth
the expected testimony, its significance, and the legal theory behind its admissibility as
follows,
It would be our contention, and this would come through the testimony of
my client when he's on the witness stand, that earlier in the evening, when
Andree became somewhat jealous at attention he [Mr. Ozuna] was paying
towards [E.8.], that Andree, the other woman present at this - at his
house in Nampa, told him that, basically, you don't want to have anything
to do with her, she has a sexually transmitted disease.
My client is not - and I would not be offering that from that point of view for
the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, I do not think I am under 412.
I would be offering that statement because my client, at least believing it
true, or at least believing it could be true, that is why he, in fact - even
though [E.B.] was allegedly throwing herself at my client - why he chose
not to have sexual relations with her. It was a factor in his choice not to
have sexual relations with [E.B.]. And I am not offering it - and this is why
I shouldn't - it shouldn't be under 412. I'm not offering it to say - at that
point, I'm not offering it to say she had chlamydia. At that point, I'm
saying, we don't know, but my client believed it could be true and,
therefore, he chose not to have sex with her. It is basically the - a reason
that he chose not to have sexual relations with her.
And again, I don't think it comes under 412 because that is very clear and
would be very clear that this is not being offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, truth of the matter asserted being she has chlamydia. It is being
offered for my client's state of mind for a reason that he decided he wasn't
going to roll the dice.

Judge, it's not reputation evidence because I'm not really offering it for
that. I'm simply offering it as my client's motivation. It is - it is not being
offered for reputation or anything. And Judge, I certainly have no
argument regarding any other failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 412.
(Tr., p.242, L.22 - p.243, L 16.)
3
At trial, Mr. Ozuna testified that E.B., whom he met through an adults-only telephone
chat line (Tr., p.586, L.6 - p.588, L.25), had previously told him that she was nineteen
years old. (Tr., p.599, Ls.12-16.) Her actual age, then, would not have been a factor
that would have discouraged him from having sex with her.
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objection to all the cautionary instructions the Court wishes to give that it's
not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. I'm doing it because
my client's state of mind, his motivation is exactly what it's central to the
issue, Judge. It's central to the issue.
(Tr., p.246, L.4 - p.248, L.9.) Defense counsel then explained, "If I was offering it for
the truth, that the rumor is she has chlamydia, yes, that would be" something that fell
under Rule 412. (Tr., p.252, Ls.1-4.)
In ruling that Mr. Ozuna could not testify that he had learned from Andree that
E.B. had chlamydia, resulting in him having no desire to have sexual intercourse with

B., the district court explained,

[l]t would be stated opinion or reputation regarding the fact that the
defendant [sic] had a sexually transmitted disease. And the Court has
made its ruling under 412. And the Court will stand by its ruling. The
evidence will not be placed before the jury. And if it's determined that I am
wrong, I will graciously accept the correction by an appellate court. And
again, I pointed out this is a tough decision, but I think the rule specifically
addresses this issue.
(Tr., p.255, L.12 - p.256, L.2.)
In order for Rule 412 to apply, the proffered evidence must be either "reputation
or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim" or "evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior." l.R.E. 412(a) and (b). The issue of whether a defendant,
who believed that a person has a communicable disease, may testify as to that belief
and the effect that it had in causing him not to have sexual intercourse with the person,
appears to be one of first impression in Idaho.
As an initial matter, no definition of the term "sexual behavior" appears to have
been developed by Idaho appellate courts.

See State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 67

(Ct. App. 1998) (declining to define the scope of the term "past sexual behavior,"
choosing instead to decide the case under Rule 403). However, the Oregon Court of
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Appeals has interpreted the term "past sexual behavior" from a nearly-identical section
of its rape shield law4 as follows:
We hold that "past sexual behavior" means a volitional or non-volitional
physical act that the victim has performed for the purpose of the sexual
stimulation or gratification of either the victim or another person or an act
that is sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact, or
an attempt to engage in such an act, between the victim and another
person.
Wright, 776 P.2d at 1297-98. The Supreme Court of Iowa has adopted the Oregon

Court of Appeals' definition when interpreting its own rape shield law. State v. Baker,
679 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Wright).
While no Idaho appellate court has tackled the issue, appellate courts in several
states have held that evidence that an alleged victim actually has a sexually transmitted
disease is not prohibited under those states' rape shield laws because presenting such
testimony does not amount to disclosing specific instances of prior sexual behavior.
See, e.g., State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661, 667 (S.D. 1994) (holding that, in seeking to

offer the fact that the alleged victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault,
which defendant did not subsequently contract, "Steele sought not to offer evidence of
any specific instance of [the victim's] prior sexual contacts, as prohibited by the rape
shield statute"); Evans v. Com., 415 S.E.2d 851, 855 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) ("Evidence
that the complaining witness learned that she had contracted a venereal disease is not
evidence of general reputation or of specific prior sexual 'conduct' which [the rape shield
statute] shields."); Reece v. State, 383 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); but see
Fells v. State, 207 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Ark. 2005) (holding, in an issue of first impression,

4

The relevant portion of the law read, "For purposes of this section, the term 'past
sexual behavior' means sexual behavior with respect to which rape, sodomy or sexual
abuse or attempted rape, sodomy or sexual abuse is alleged." State v. Wright, 776
P .2d 1294, 1297 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
8

"that the HIV status of a rape victim is protected under Arkansas' rape-shield statute"
but cautioned that "[o]ne should not conclude, as the dissent suggests, that a defendant
can never present evidence of a rape victim's HIV status when that evidence is relevant
to a defense at trial"); State v. Cunningham, 995 P.2d 561, 568-69 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
("Evidence that a victim has a sexually transmitted disease is as much evidence of past
sexual behavior as evidence of intercourse or other sexual contact.").
In Reece, the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence that the alleged
victim had tested positive for a sexually transmitted disease immediately after the
alleged sexual assault and that the defendant and his wife did not have such a disease
did not fall under the state's rape shield statute, explaining,
Perhaps it might suggest by deduction that if defendant did not have the
disease, and did not transmit it to the victim, then someone else might
have done so. This is not an improper attempt to explore the victim's past
or other sexual experience; and if under some remote consideration it
suggests that (in addition to perhaps bathing in water which another
infected person had enjoyed) the victim had some sexual activity with
someone else, so be it. That is speculation only. Any possible harm
caused to the victim by such speculation is far outweighed by the harm
done to the defendant in denying him the opportunity to prove he did not
have the disease. Such speculation should not stand in the way of
allowing defendant to present this vital defense to the prejudicial testimony
elicited by the State.

Reece, 383 S.E.2d at 574 (emphasis added). In Evans, the Virginia Court of Appeals
reasoned, "Although a venereal disease is usually sexually transmitted, evidence that a
person has learned that he or she has contracted a venereal disease is not proof of
specific sexual conduct." Evans, 415 S.E.2d at 855.
Mr. Ozuna urges this Court to accept the reasoning of the courts in Reece,

Evans, and Steele that evidence concerning whether an alleged victim has a sexually
transmitted disease does not fall under the prohibitions of rape shield laws. As both the

Reece and Evans Courts explained, the fact that a person has a sexually transmitted
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disease does not amount to a statement that the person has had sex, let alone
constitute evidence of a specific prior instance of sexual conduct There is no reason to
conclude that Idaho's rape shield rule should be read any differently, especially with
respect to a claim, not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that a defendant's
reason for not having sexual intercourse with an alleged victim was fear of contracting a
sexually transmitted disease he believed she had.
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Ozuna was not offering the testimony to prove that
B. actually had chlamydia further undermines the district court's conclusion that this

evidence fell under Rule 412. This is reinforced by the Idaho Court of Appeals' recent
explanation of the reasons for the adoption of rape shield laws, namely, "Rape shield
laws are rules of exclusion of evidence of a victim's sexual behavior, adopted in large
part to protect victims and prevent use of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior for
improper and irrelevant purposes." State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 954 n.3 (Ct. App.

2010) (emphasis added).
Because the proffered evidence does not fall within the scope of Rule 412, the
district court erred when it excluded the evidence on that basis. As such, this Court
should vacate Mr. Ozuna's conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

See

State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (where district court applies wrong standard

in excluding defense evidence the remedy is to vacate the conviction and remand for a
new trial).

2.

Exclusion Of The Proffered Testimony Violated Mr. Ozuna's Constitutional
Rights To Present A Defense And To A Fair Trial Under The Sixth And
Fourteenth Amendments

Rule 412 does not apply to bar evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior when
it "is constitutionally required to be admitted
10

" l.R.E. 412(b)(1).

In considering

whether exclusion under Rule 412 violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense, Idaho appellate courts must apply a two-part test. First, because a
defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence, the court must
determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant.

Second, the court must "ask

whether other legitimate interests outweighed" the defendant's interest in presenting the
proffered evidence. In considering the issue, an Idaho appellate court "will find a Sixth
Amendment violation only if [it] conclude[s] that the trial court abused its discretion."
State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-15 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d

1544 (9th Cir. 1992)). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401.
Mr. Ozuna maintains that the first part of the test, whether the proffered evidence
was relevant, is clearly satisfied. Whether Mr. Ozuna had a plausible reason for not
wanting to engage in sexual intercourse with E.B. goes to the heart of his defense.
Central to his defense was his testimony that he did not have sexual intercourse with
E.B., whom he believed to be of age, 5 because he had no desire to do so. What was
absent from his testimony in support of his defense was the reason that he rejected her
aggressive pursuit of sex with him was that he believed her to be afflicted with
chlamydia.
In order to understand how critical the excluded information was to Mr. Ozuna's
defense, it is necessary to examine his actual trial testimony.

At trial, Mr. Ozuna

testified that, while E.B. used the bathroom, Andree told him, "[E.B.]'s checking you out
and stuff. She's giggling, she's coming on to you. And don't be messing with her." At

5

See note 3, supra.
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that point, defense counsel said, "Okay.

I want to stop you right there. Okay." This

was an attempt to avoid violating the district court's order concerning what Andree told
him about

8. having chlamydia.

(Tr., p.601, Ls.9-22.)

Andree then left the room

briefly, and E.B. flirted with Mr. Ozuna before throwing him on the bed and getting on
top of him, at which point Andree, wearing lingerie, walked back in and started yelling at
them. (Tr., p.602, Ls.3-25.)
Andree became enraged, and "ran down the alley like a lunatic for a couple of
minutes," before returning and asking to use the phone. Mr. Ozuna offered to call a cab
for E.B. and Andree because he wanted them to "get the hell out of [t)here." Andree
then used the phone to arrange a ride with "some guy in a truck that she met on Live
Links."

Mr. Ozuna asked her to take E.B. with her, but she refused to do so.

(Tr., p.603, L.25 - p.606, L.20.) At that point, Mr. Ozuna went to his futon and "crashed
out" wearing just his boxer shorts and a tank top. (Tr., p.607, LA - p.608, L.2.)
Some time later, he awoke to find E.B. "straddling" him. He said, "I was wet, and

I - and there was - and there was, like, discharge. And I told her, what the fuck. And I
said, I have to work tomorrow. And I told her some stuff that I'd heard about her that

wasn't cool."

(Tr., p.608, Ls.8-14 (emphasis added).)

At that point, the prosecutor

interjected, clearly attempting to ensure compliance with the pre-trial ruling preventing
Mr. Ozuna from testifying as to why he didn't want to have sex with E.B. (Tr., p.608,
L.15.) Mr. Ozuna then testified, "Anyway, I just - in a rage, I just yelled some stuff, and
went to my room to go lay in my bed. And it was wet from piss or beer. I have no clue.
So I laid on the floor." (Tr., p.608, Ls.19-22 (emphasis added).) The district court's
ruling prevented Mr. Ozuna from providing a plausible explanation as to why he was
enraged by E.B.'s attempt to sexually assault him, as well as why he would refuse to
12

have sex with a more-than-willing female whom he believed to be of legal age.
Depriving him of that opportunity gutted his defense, and deprived the jurors of hearing
relevant evidence necessary to exercising their truth-seeking function.
In Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 603 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), the
appellate court considered the state's rape shield law in a rape prosecution in which the
defendant wished to explain that he did not have sexual intercourse with the alleged
victim because of his fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease from her.
Specifically, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that a coworker of the alleged
victim had told him, prior to the alleged rape, that he had contracted "crabs" after having
sex with her. Thevenin, 603 N.E.2d at 589. He also sought to testify that "because of
his fear of developing the condition, he was disinclined to have natural sexual
intercourse[6 ] with the complainant."

Defense counsel noted that the evidence was

necessary to present a defense. Id. at 589-90. In refusing to allow the evidence, the
trial court reasoned that "in his view, 'crabs' is more easily cured than certain other
venereal diseases, and because he doubted that the defendant thought that the
complainant still had the disease, the judge concluded that fear of it would not 'deter a
sexually aroused young man who had his mind on satisfaction." Id. at 590.
In cross-examining the defendant, the prosecutor "reviewed with the defendant in
detail each of the complainant's sexually provocative actions and comments to which
the defendant had referred in his direct testimony and questioned him in reference to
each such action and comment about his disinterest in engaging in natural sexual
intercourse." Id. Defense counsel objected to the line of questioning in light of the pre-

6

The reference to "natural sexual intercourse" was because the defendant did admit to
having digitally penetrated her with her consent.
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trial ruling.

Id.

While the trial court terminated the line of questioning, noting, "I'm

having a real problem with my ruling now. You've got him looking like a jackass," it did
not revisit its earlier ruling. Id.
The appellate court declined to create a general rule allowing for questions
concerning sexually transmitted diseases in every case because "given the prevalence
of sexually-transmitted diseases" it "would undoubtedly encourage a significant number
of inquiries into the sexual history of rape complainants, causing them humiliation and
discouraging them from reporting the crime to law enforcement authorities." Id. at 593.
The court did, however, find error in excluding the evidence in light of the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the defendant, because it made "the defendant's testimony
concerning his actions appear altogether incredible even though the defendant had
sought to offer a plausible explanation, the credibility of which should have been for the
jury." Id.
While there is some difference between the facts in Thevenin and Mr. Ozuna's
case, namely, the fact that the prosecuting attorney was responsible for making his
defense look incredible, he maintains that the case supports his argument. Specifically,
by preventing Mr. Ozuna from offering a reasonable explanation for turning down sex
with a person he believed to be of age, both his ability and his right to present a defense
were fatally weakened. Absent a legitimate reason for turning down sex, it is unlikely
that a jury would believe that a man seeking companionship through an adults-only
telephone chat line would have done so under the circumstances.

The excluded

evidence, therefore, was crucial to establishing Mr. Ozuna's state of mind at the time of
the alleged assault, and providing a reasonable explanation for why he turned down
sex.
14

\/Vith respect to the second prong of the test, whether other legitimate interests
outweighed Mr. Ozuna's right to present a defense, the district court appears to have
abused its discretion by failing to conduct such a balancing test.

Nowhere in its

statement explaining its ruling did the district court mention the requirement that it
consider whether "other legitimate interests outweighed" Mr. Ozuna's interest in
exercising his right to present a defense, it merely concluded, "I do not find that this
evidence is constitutionally required to be admitted." (Tr., p.245, Ls.2-4.) This failure
occurred despite defense counsel arguing, "I understand we have victims [sic] rights
here, Judge, but we also have a man facing very serious charges. And any error made
should be made - anything that's on the line, Mr. Ozuna should get the benefit of the
doubt here." (Tr., p.240, Ls.1-5 (emphasis added).)
Even assuming that the district court's one sentence conclusion that the
evidence was not constitutionally required to be admitted constituted the required
weighing of interests, Mr. Ozuna maintains that it was an abuse of discretion to so
conclude in light of its crucial importance to his defense, when considered alongside
any unidentified "other legitimate interests."

In support of this argument, Mr. Ozuna

cites to the Georgia Court of Appeals' reasoning in Reece that "[a]ny possible harm
caused to the victim by such speculation [that she had contracted a sexually transmitted
disease through sexual activity] is far outweighed by the harm done to the defendant in
denying him the opportunity to" present the evidence. Reece, 383 S.E.2d at 574.
Because the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Ozuna's
constitutional rights to present a defense and to a fair trial, his conviction must be
vacated, with this matter remanded for a new trial.
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See Meister, 148 Idaho at 240

(where district court applies wrong standard in excluding defense evidence the remedy
is to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial).

11.
The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Proffered Evidence Fell Under Idaho
Rule Of Evidence 412, And Violated Mr. Ozuna's Constitutional Rights To Present A
Defense And To A Fair Trial, When It Prevented Him From Presenting Evidence That
E.B. Had Chlamydia At The Time Of The Alleged Assault, And That He Did Not
Contract Chlamydia Following The Alleged Assault

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ozuna asserts that the district court erred in concluding that the proffered

evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violated his constitutional rights to
present a defense and to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, when
it prevented him from presenting evidence that E.B. had chlamydia at the time of the
alleged assault, and that he did not contract chlamydia following the alleged assault.
The district court erred because the proffered evidence did not fall within the scope of
Rule 412.

Furthermore, even assuming that it did, enforcing Rule 412 to bar its

admission violated Mr. Ozuna's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

B.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Proffered Evidence Fell Under
Idaho Rule Of Evidence 412, And Violated Mr. Ozuna's Constitutional Rights To
Present A Defense And To A Fair Trial, When It Prevented Him From Presenting
Evidence That E.B. Had Chlamydia At The Time Of The Alleged Assault, And
That He Did Not Contract Chlamydia Following The Alleged Assault

1.

The Proffered Evidence Does Not Fall Within Rule 412

In his offer of proof, defense counsel explained that, at trial, he wished to ask
E.B. whether she had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault. 7 (Tr., p.229, Ls.17-

7

Evidence provided by the State to defense counsel on the eve of trial confirmed that
E.B. suffered from chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault. (Tr., p.242, Ls.22-24.)

16

.) He then represented that Mr. Ozuna would testify "that he has since been to a
doctor, had, basically, a full physical, and he does not suffer from a sexually transmitted
disease.

He does not suffer from chlamydia, and never came down with any signs."

(Tr., p.230, Ls.7-12.)

The State opposed, arguing that the proffered evidence fell

"squarely under 412 and it's [a] prior sexual act," and made its own offer of proof that a
doctor had told the State, inter alia, that "the transmission rate of STD via intercourse is
not a hundred percent." (Tr., p.234, L.15

p.235, L.4.)

Defense counsel argued that the proffered evidence did not fall under Rule 412
because he had "no intent on asking her how she had a sexually transmitted disease,
how she contracted it. I am simply going to ask whether she had it." (Tr., p.238, Ls.9-

15.) With respect to the State's argument that the evidence wasn't relevant because
the transmission rate for sexually transmitted diseases is not one hundred percent,
defense counsel responded, "I do think it is a relevant piece of information, because, for
relevance, it doesn't require the hundred percent certainty standard that [the prosecutor]
seems to be holding me to.

It is simply evidence that tends to show something is

probable, Judge." (Tr., p.239, Ls.19-24.)
Ultimately, the district court concluded, pursuant to Rule 412, that the proffered
evidence "is evidence of a victim's past behavior, suggesting she had past sexual
activities. And I will not allow the evidence to be addressed during the trial." (Tr., p.243,
Ls.17-21.)
Appellate courts in at least three states - South Dakota, Georgia, and Virginia have held that the type of evidence proffered by Mr. Ozuna does not fall within the
strictures of rape shield laws.

See Steele, Reece, and Evans; but see Fells, 207

S.W.3d at 502 (holding, in an issue of first impression, "that the HIV status of a rape
17

victim is protected under Arkansas' rape-shield statute" but cautioned that "[o]ne should
not conclude, as the dissent suggests, that a defendant can never present evidence of a
rape victim's HIV status when that evidence is relevant to a defense at trial");
Cunningham, 995 P .2d at 568-69 ("Evidence that a victim has a sexually transmitted
disease is as much evidence of past sexual behavior as evidence of intercourse or
other sexual contact.").
In Steele, the South Dakota Supreme Court considered whether evidence that an
alleged victim of rape had tested positive for chlamydia while the defendant had tested
negative ran afoul of the state's rape shield law in determining whether the trial court
erred in denying a motion for new trial.

The motion for new trial concerned the

prosecutor's suppression of evidence that the alleged victim had chlamydia at the time
of the alleged rape by the defendant. Steele, 510 N.W. 2d at 664. In concluding that
the suppressed evidence didn't require a new trial, the trial court concluded that such
evidence would have been inadmissible under the state's rape shield law because "[i]f
evidence was offered that the victim had chlamydia, and that she did not contract it from
the Defendant, the jury would become aware that the victim had been engaged in some
prior sexual contact with a third person."

Id. at 667.

In rejecting the trial court's

reasoning, the South Dakota Supreme Court explained that such a concern was
misplaced because "this is not 'specific instances of a victim's prior sexual conduct." Id.
(quoting rape shield statute) (emphasis in original). The court went on to explain that,
"[m]ost importantly, Steele sought not to offer evidence of any specific instance of [the
victim's] prior sexual contacts, as prohibited by the rape shield statute.

Rather, the

Defense sought to offer evidence that had direct bearing on the believability of the two
versions of the events .... "

Id.
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In Reece, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the applicability of the state's
rape shield law with respect to evidence of sexually transmitted diseases.

In the

prosecution's case in chief, it presented testimony from a doctor who examined the
alleged victim following the alleged assault. That doctor testified that he had observed a
vaginal infection, and that the alleged victim told him that the infection only emerged
after the alleged assault. The court noted, "There was other evidence that the victim
said she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone else, and evidence that sexual
intercourse transmits the disease." Reece, 383 S.E.2d at 573. After his objection to
this testimony was overruled, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that neither
he nor his wife had tested positive for the disease, but was prohibited from doing so. Id.
at 573-74.
In concluding that it was error for the trial court to exclude the proffered evidence,
the court explained,
We do not see how allowing this vital defense to be put forward offends
the rape shield law . . . Perhaps it might suggest by deduction that if
defendant did not have the disease, and did not transmit it to the victim,
then someone else might have done so. This is not an improper attempt
to explore the victim's past or other sexual experience; and if under some
remote consideration it suggests that (in addition to perhaps bathing in
water which another infected person had enjoyed) the victim had some
sexual activity with someone else, so be it. That is speculation only. Any
possible harm caused to the victim by such speculation is far outweighed
by the harm done to the defendant in denying him the opportunity to prove
he did not have the disease. Such speculation should not stand in the
way of allowing defendant to present this vital defense to the prejudicial
testimony elicited by the State.

Id. at 574 (emphasis added). See also Warner, 626 S.E.2d at 622-23 ("We have held
that a defendant may introduce evidence that the victim has a sexually transmitted
disease, 'not to prove that the victim had engaged in sexual intercourse with other men,
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but to exclude the possibility that he had had intercourse with her.'") (quoting
Chambers v. State, 421 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)) (emphasis in original).
In Evans, the Virginia Court of Appeals, interpreting the state's rape shield law,
held,
Evidence that the complaining witness learned that she had contracted a
venereal disease is not evidence of general reputation or of specific prior
sexual 'conduct,' which Code§ 18.2-67.7 shields ... Although a venereal
disease is usually sexually transmitted, evidence that a person has
learned that he or she has contracted a venereal disease is not proof of
specific sexual conduct.
Evans, 415 S.

2d at 855.

Mr. Ozuna asserts that, for the reasons given by the courts in Steele, Reece, and
Evans, the proffered evidence that E.B. suffered from chlamydia at the time of the
alleged assault should not have been excluded because it did not fall under Rule 412.
As such, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter
for a new trial.

See Meister, 148 Idaho at 240 (where district court applies wrong

standard in excluding defense evidence the remedy is to vacate the conviction and
remand for a new trial).

2.

Exclusion Of The Proffered Evidence Violated Mr. Ozuna's Constitutional
Rights To Present A Defense And To A Fair Trial Under The Sixth And
Fourteenth Amendments

Rule 412 does not apply to bar evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior when
it "is constitutionally required to be admitted .... " I.RE. 412(b)(1).

In considering

whether exclusion under Rule 412 violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense, Idaho appellate courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must
determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant because a defendant has no
constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. Second, the court must "ask whether
20

other legitimate interests outweighed" the defendant's interests in presenting the
proffered evidence. In considering the issue, an Idaho appellate court "will find a Sixth
Amendment violation only if [it] conclude[s] that the trial court abused its discretion."
Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-15 (citing Wood). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
l.R.E. 401.

The proffered evidence satisfies the first prong of the test, as it had a tendency to
make the existence of a fact of consequence less probable, namely whether Mr. Ozuna
had genital to genital contact with E.B. Given the fact that sexually transmitted diseases
are, unsurprisingly, transmitted via sexual intercourse, the fact that

B. had chlamydia

at the time of the alleged assault, and that Mr. Ozuna did not contract chlamydia
following the alleged assault makes it less probable that he had unprotected sexual
intercourse with her. Although no Idaho appellate court has yet decided whether an
alleged victim of sexual assault having a sexually transmitted disease at the time of the
incident is relevant when a defendant does not subsequently contract the disease,
several other states have considered the issue.
In State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1995), the Iowa Supreme Court
considered the trial court's exclusion, under the rape shield law, of evidence that the
alleged victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault and that the defendant
tested negative for chlamydia three months after the alleged assault.

The court

declined to consider whether the proffered evidence fell under the rape shield law,
instead considering it on general grounds of relevancy. Knox, 536 N.W.2d at 738.
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The court noted that the trial court had concluded, on the basis of "other
evidence," that the probative value of the evidence was "very weak," a decision with
which it agreed.

That other evidence included the fact that "[c]hlamydia is usually

transmitted by sexual intercourse" and that "[a] male has a thirty percent chance of
contracting the disease from an infected female in a single act of intercourse," but that
the use of a condom "substantially reduces this risk." Id. Other evidence significant to
the finding included the following:
[T]he complainant testified that she was penetrated but she was not sure
whether she had been penetrated with a penis, a finger, or some other
object. She also testified that Knox did not move his body as if he were
having sexual intercourse. Nor could she tell whether he reached any
kind of climax. Investigators found no seminal fluid or foreign pubic hairs
in the complainant's underpants. Had such evidence been found, one
could reasonably infer unprotected sexual intercourse. Shortly after the
alleged incident, the police arrested Knox and found condoms in his
pocket. All of this evidence suggests that Knox may have used a condom
or may have digitally penetrated the complainant. In either of these
events, the chances of Knox contracting chlamydia was nil.
Finally, there was evidence that chlamydia is easily treatable with widely
available antibiotics. This suggests that Knox could have been infected at
the time of the alleged incident but was cured when tested three months
later.

Id. at 738-39.

See a/so Fells, 207 S.W.3d at 502 (holding, in an issue of first

impression, "that the HIV status of a rape victim is protected under Arkansas' rapeshield statute" but cautioned that "[o]ne should not conclude, as the dissent suggests,
that a defendant can never present evidence of a rape victim's HIV status when that

evidence is relevant to a defense at trial') (emphasis added); Warner, 626 S.E.2d at
622-23 ("We have held that a defendant may introduce evidence that the victim has a
sexually transmitted disease, 'not to prove that the victim had engaged in sexual
intercourse with other men, but to exclude the possibility that he had had intercourse
with her."') (quoting Chambers v. State, 421 S.E.2d 326 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
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The facts of Mr. Ozuna's case are distinguishable from those of Knox in two
important respects. First, the testimony of

B. established that she believed that

unprotected vaginal sex occurred. (Tr., p.282, L.7 - p.303, L.9.) Second, Mr. Ozuna's
offer of proof was that "he has since been to a doctor, had basically, a full physical, and
he does not suffer from a sexually transmitted disease.

chlamydia, and never came down with any signs."

He does not suffer from

(Tr., p.230, Ls.7-12 (emphasis

added).) This differs from the proffered evidence in Knox, which consisted of nothing
more than evidence that, three months after the fact, the defendant tested negative for
chlamydia.
With respect to the second prong of the test, whether other legitimate interests
outweighed Mr. Ozuna's right to present a defense, the district court appears to have
abused its discretion by failing to conduct such a balancing test.

Nowhere in its

statement explaining its ruling did the district court mention the requirement that it
consider whether "other legitimate interests outweighed" Mr. Ozuna's interest in
exercising his right to present a defense, it merely concluded, "I do not find that this
evidence is constitutionally required to be admitted." (Tr., p.245, Ls.2-4.) This failure
occurred despite defense counsel arguing, "I understand we have victims [sic] rights
here, Judge, but we also have a man facing very serious charges. And any error made
should be made - anything that's on the line, Mr. Ozuna should get the benefit of the

doubt here." (Tr., p.240, Ls.1-5 (emphasis added).)
Because the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Ozuna's
constitutional rights to present a defense and to a fair trial, his conviction must be
vacated, with this matter remanded for a new trial.
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See Meister, 148 Idaho at 240

(where district court applies wrong standard in excluding defense evidence the remedy
is to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial).

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Life Sentence, With Twenty
Years Fixed, Following Mr. Ozuna's Conviction For Lewd Conduct With A Sentencing
Enhancement
Mr. Ozuna asserts that, given any view of the facts, his life sentence, with twenty
years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho
771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ozuna does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Ozuna must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences
were excessive considering any view of the facts.
objectives of criminal punishment are:

Id.

The governing criteria or

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that an important factor in fashioning a
sentence is whether an offender enjoys the support of family and friends in his
rehabilitation efforts. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing
24

sentence of defendant who, inter a/ia, had the support of his family in his rehabilitation
efforts).

Mr. Ozuna enjoys the support of his family and friends.

arrest, Mr. Ozuna was residing with his father.
(hereinafter, PSI), p.10.)

At the time of his

(Presentence Investigation Report

His family and friends, including his mother, four aunts, a

niece, and his sister, provided letters of support to the district court. (Sentencing Exhibit
No. 2 (eight letters in support of Mr. Ozuna).) One aunt, Patricia Salas, described the
incredible amount of family support enjoyed by Mr. Ozuna, writing, "I also believe that
with the help of such a large family that he has we can help and support him in anyway
[sic] that we can ... Rich has always had the love and respect of his entire family. His
mother and sister have always been there for him as well as his family." (Sentencing
Exhibit No. 2 (Letter of Patricia Ann Salas).) His sister, Melissa Ozuna, echoed these
remarks, writing, "We are all here and supportive of him ... I believe with his family
being here and supporting him out here he can be given opportunity ... myself and my
family will be his support through this trying time." (Sentencing Exhibit No. 2 (Letter of
Melissa Ozuna).) The other letters reiterated the strong family support that Mr. Ozuna
enjoys. (Sentencing Exhibit No. 2.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme
Court reduced a sentence based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for
treating the problem." Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that
ingestion of drugs and alcohol, resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of
conduct, can be a mitigating circumstance.
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State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414

(1981). The charge for which Mr. Ozuna was found guilty involved alcohol. According
to his mother, Mr. Ozuna's alcohol problem began when his parents divorced while he

was in the eighth grade. The divorce was "devastating" to him, causing everything in
his life to "spiral[] downhill," and as a result, "alcohol took over his life." (Sentencing
Exhibit No. 2 (Letter of Helen Salas).) The PSI writer described Mr. Ozuna's "history of
substance and alcohol abuse" and noted that "[h]is prior record consists of seven drug
and/or alcohol-related charges." (PSI, p.11.)
ML Ozuna asserts that, in light of the mitigating factors known to the district court
at the time of sentencing, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
unified life sentence, with twenty years fixed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

In the

alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a unified
sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, or otherwise reduce it as this Court
deems appropriate.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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